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Abstract 
In this dissertation we apply Filter Rules (FR), Moving Average Crossover (MA), 
Relative Strength Indicator (RSI) and Bollinger Bands (BB) techniques to the Iberian 
Stock Markets, from 01/07/2009 to 30/06/2015, We study the impact of three different 
transaction costs, as well as the possibility to have short-selling constrains, in order to 
identify if these trading rules work for every type of investor (in terms of transactions 
costs and type of stock market strategies). Furthermore, we check if there is any size, 
volatility and/or industry bias. 
On our work we’ve found that technical analysis’s based on these rules is not always 
profitable, but, when it is, it is able to produce statistically significant profits, even after 
considering transaction costs and short selling constrains. There is some evidence that the 
level of  profitable is higher for stocks with higher betas, and we watch some industry and 
size bias. 
Key-words: Stock Markets, Technical Analysis, Simple Technical Trading Rules, 
Institutional Traders, Retail Traders. 
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1. Introduction 
“As long as financial markets have existed, people have tried to forecast them, in the 
hope that good forecasts would bring them great fortunes.” (Griffioen, 2003, p.1). 
Nowadays we see a wide group of investors that use technical analysis, who try to 
predict movements in order to profit from them. “The trend is your friend” is one of the 
best known sayings on Wall Street. This can be accomplished by using a wide range of 
available methodologies. 
With the introduction of the “Dow Theory”, simple technical trading rules popularity 
rose amongst all types of traders: from institutional to individual investors; as these 
strategies are easy to implement and to understand. However, not all investors have the 
same costs or tools at their disposal, as institutional investors have access to cheaper 
transaction costs and short selling abilities, the individual investor has higher 
transaction costs and some short selling constrains. 
Not only practitioners but also academics use simple technical trading rules in order to 
test Market Efficiency (see Fama 1970). Therefore, the main question of this 
dissertation is: (1) “Are the Portuguese and Spanish stock markets efficient?”.  Also we 
try to answer the following questions: (2) “Are the profits from these technical trading 
rules the same for every type of trader?” and (3) “Are these profits predominant in any 
type of stock?”. 
In order to do so, in the section 2, we present a literature review of the topic. First we 
study its predictability, further by the evidence of practice, followed by some 
explanations to these profits and, finally, focus on related studies performed in the 
Portuguese and Spanish market. 
In section 3, we explain the methodology we have used. From the data we used, to 
strategies we have tested, the Bootstrap Critical Value in order to test the statistically 
significance of these profits and, lastly, the market conditions of our investor. 
In section 4, we will present our results. We start by presenting the Relative Strength 
Indicator and Filter Rules results. Then, we deepen the analysis of the Bollinger Bands, 
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complemented by the bootstrap analysis. Finally, we show the results from all the 
Moving Averages combinations, whereas we will only go deeper in those strategies 
which beat the buy-and-hold strategy in every market condition the strategy, again 
complemented by the bootstrap analysis. 
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2. Literature review 
Technical analysis uses past information, such as volumes and prices, in order to make 
investment decisions. A more specific definition was provided by Pring (2002): “The 
technical approach to investment is essentially a reflection of the idea that prices move 
in trends that are determined by the changing attitudes of investors toward a variety of 
economic, monetary, political, and psychological forces. The art of technical analysis, 
for it is an art, is to identify a trend reversal at a relatively early stage and ride on that 
trend until the weight of the evidence shows or proves that the trend has reversed” (p. 
2). Another simple, yet straight forward definition was proposed by Griffioen (2003, 
p.4): Technical analysis is the study of past price movements with the goal to predict 
future price movements from the past (p. 4). Technical analysts use three simple 
principles: (1) an asset’s price history incorporates all relevant information, (2) asset 
prices move in trends and (3) history repeats itself. However, the view on the 
predictability in financial  markets has changed over the years. In this section, the main 
studies presented in the literature are examined. 
2.1. Predictability in Financial Markets 
Technical methods date back at least to 1700, but it was with the introduction of the 
“Dow Theory”, proposed by Charles H. Dow and William Peter Hamilton in the late 
1800’s, that popularized them. Technical analysis was initially developed for the stock 
market (e.g. Donchian, 1960; Alexander, 1961; Smidt, 1965; Levy, 1971). With the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System, in early 1973, its popularity rose within 
market participants in the foreign exchange market (e.g. Logue et al., 1977 and 1978; 
Neely 1997). 
Although technical analysis has been used by many practitioners in the early phases (see 
Stewart 1949), academics tend to be sceptical towards this view. With the appearance of 
the Markowitz’ portfolio theory (1952) and the famous asset pricing method: CAPM 
(see Sharpe, 1964; and Lintner, 1965), the idea of efficient and unpredictable markets 
rose. Corroborated by the acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis, introduced by 
Fama (1970), and due to several negative empirical studies within the stock market (e.g. 
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Fama and Blume, 1966; Van Horne and Parker, 1967 and 1968; Jensen and Benington, 
1970), the idea of unpredictable markets was widely accepted by academics. According 
to the efficient market hypothesis, irrational investors should quickly be driven out of 
the market as they make losses at the expense of rational traders (see Menkhoff and 
Taylor, 2007).  
One of the first critiques to the efficient market hypothesis was done by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), which lead to a hot debate between proponents and opponents of 
Fama’s Efficient Market Hypothesis. In the efficient market hypothesis the short-run 
serial correlations are zero, however Lo and MacKinlay (1990) prove that it is not zero 
and there are “too many” successive moves in the same direction enable them to reject 
the hypothesis that stock prices behave as random walks. After several examples of 
evidence against efficient markets (e.g. Shiller, 2000), behavioural finance has 
continuously grown over the past years. 
“The reality is that financial markets are self-destabilizing; occasionally they tend 
toward disequilibrium, not equilibrium” (G. Soros 2008). 
2.2. Evidence on the practice of Technical Analysis 
Numerous surveys studies were performed in order to investigate market participants’ 
behaviour in speculative markets. Early studies, such as Smidt (1965), show a high 
increase in percentage of market participants that use the technical analysis. More 
interesting surveys shows that institutional market participants around the world believe 
that the technical analysis is the major factor determining exchange rates in the short 
run up to 6 months (e.g. Brosen and Irwin, 1987; Frankel and Froot, 1990; Taylor and 
Allen, 1992; Menkhoff, 1997; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Oberlechner, 2001; Gehrig and 
Menkhoff, 2003).  
A detailed literature review was done by Park and Irwin (2004 and 2007) that included 
all of this information and concluded that the technical analysis is important to 
determine price movements in short time horizons within the futures and foreign 
exchange markets, however, this evidence was not found in the stock market. A more 
recent survey demonstrates the use of the technical analysis by fund managers is also 
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higher for short term horizons (Menkhoff, 2010), and that during periods of high 
investor sentiment, the use of the technical analysis is associated with higher 
performance, lower risk, and superior market timing within the hedge fund industry 
(Smith et al., 2015). Despite its popularity, the technical analysis is normally used as a 
complimentary tool of decision for retail investors in the Portuguese market (Rocha, 
2014). 
2.3. Profitability of Technical Analysis 
The controversy about the usefulness of the technical analysis has led to voluminous 
literature on the subject. Empirical studies were performed in order to investigate the 
profitability of technical trading rules in a variety of markets; this served the purpose of 
either uncovering profitable trading rules and/or testing market efficiency. 
For example, in efficient market models such as martingale (Samuelson, 1965; and 
Mandelbrot, 1966) and random walk models (Fama, 1970) technical trading rules do not 
generate enough profits to beat the market, because markets even in its weakest form 
(see Roberts, 1959) already reflects all available information, including past prices. 
In the early years, from 1960 until 1987, empirical studies started to emerge. Most 
studies concentrate on stock markets and foreign exchange markets, while a smaller 
number of studies analyse futures markets, in order to investigate if several technical 
trading systems generate abnormal profits. These studies includes filter rules 
(Alexander, 1961 and 1964; Fama and Blume, 1966; Sweeney, 1986), moving averages 
(Cootner, 1962; Van Horne and Parker, 1967 and 1968; Dale and Workman, 1980), 
stop-loss orders (Houthakker, 1961; Gray and Nielsen, 1963), channels (Donchian, 
1960; Irwin and Uhrig, 1984), momentum oscillators (Smidt, 1965a) and relative 
strength indicator (Levy, 1967a and 1967b; Jensen and Benington, 1970). These did not 
find any excess of profits in the long run, against the buy and hold strategy, when 
transaction costs are taken into account. However, this evidence was not found in the 
foreign and futures markets where there was substantial net profits (e.g. Smidt, 1965; 
Leuthold, 1972; Cornell and Dietrich, 1978; Irwin and Uhrig, 1984; Sweeney, 1986; 
Taylor, 1986).  
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The results of these simple techniques suggest that stock markets were more efficient 
than foreign exchange markets or futures markets before the mid-1980s. However, these 
studies have strong limitations: only a small number of trading systems were 
investigated, no statistical significance on technical trading systems, risk was ignored, 
results are reported in terms of an “average” across all assets, and data snooping. 
A more comprehensive analysis, than any earlier study mentioned before, was done by 
Lukac et al. (1988), which considered risk and transaction costs. They rejected 
Martingale efficient market models in the futures markets, proving that technical trading 
rules were more profitable than a buy and hold strategy, risk adjusted. Following this 
trend, more and considerable improved empirical studies started to appear. These more 
complex models still have considerable differences with regards to treatment of 
transaction costs, risk, parameter optimization, out-of-sample tests, statistical tests, and 
data snooping. 
These complex techniques suggests that technical trading strategies did not yield 
economic profits in developed stock markets (e.g. Ready, 2002; Ülkü and Prodan, 
2013). However, several studies find economic profits in emerging stock markets (e.g. 
Ratner and Leal, 1999) and for small cap firms (Shynkevich, 2012). As for foreign 
exchange markets, it seems evident that technical trading strategies generated economic 
profits over the last few decades. Researchers have demonstrated the generation of 
excess returns over a long period of time with more complex models, but relatively too 
simple rules had disappeared by the early 1990s (see Neely and Weller, 2001 and 2011; 
Sapp, 2004; Tabak and Lima, 2009). For the futures markets, technical trading 
strategies appear to be profitable between the 1970s and 1980s, but recent studies tend 
to suggest market efficiency in this market (e.g. Yen and Hsu, 2010).  
2.4. Empirical Explanations  
As previews empirical studies suggests, technical trading rules may generate positive 
profits mainly in foreign exchange and futures markets. According to theory, these rules 
should not generate excess returns, but several theoretical and empirical explanations 
have been proposed in order to explain these abnormal profits. On the one hand, we 
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have theoretical models explaining technical trading profits because of market 
‘frictions’. And, on the other hand, we have empirical explanations focusing on 
technical trading profits as a consequence of temporary market inefficiencies. 
In general terms we can mention a few theoretical explanations. The Noisy Rational 
Expectations Models states: if the current price reflects all available information, and as 
a result the competitive market breaks down, no agent in a competitive market has an 
incentive to collect and analyse costly information (see Grossman and Stiglitz 1976 and 
1980). Behavioural models are also another possible explanation for this factor. One 
example is explained by De Long et al., 1990, which shows that momentum in the short 
run is amplified due to noise traders and arbitrageurs to ultimately force prices to return 
to fundamental levels. Herding models are based on the fact that as long as there is a 
large bulk of market participants that use chart techniques, such as technical indicators, 
it is profitable as long as they use models with the same indicator, making even more 
popular methods that are profitable (see Froot et al, 1992; and Schmidt, 2002). Finally, 
the Chaos theory, where Clyde and Osler (1997) provide another theoretical explanation 
for technical analysis by showing that chart traders may do non-linear forecasting 
methods for high dimension (or chaotic, as they mentioned) systems. Their results show 
that technical analysis has no more predictive power on non-linear data than it does on 
random data; and when applied to non-linear data, technical analysis earns no more 
hypothetical profits than those generated by a random trading rule were rejected, 
suggesting that technical trading rules may generate profits. 
As for empirical explanations, which are more relevant for our work, we can distinguish 
the following: central bank intervention, order flow, temporary market inefficiencies, 
risk premiums, market microstructure deficiencies and data snooping.  
Another explanation for these profits is the central bank interventions. Many authors 
have shown that technical trading profits are highly correlated with central bank 
intervention (see Dooley and Shafer, 1983; Sweeney, 1986; Lukac et al., 1988; Silber, 
1994, among others). In order to reduce volatility, central banks try to prevent the 
exchange rate from jumping, by going against the wind. They will make the adjustment 
of the exchange rate slower; therefore, it will show a trend within this timeframe. This 
will lead that technical analysts may pick up profits from this trends. A representative 
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study was done by LeBaron (1999). He has used daily official intervention series to 
demonstrate that when a technical trading rule, such as moving average rule, generates 
buy signals for a foreign exchange rate, the Federal Reserve tends to support the dollar 
the next period. This finding is consistent with a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy. He 
also finds that removal of intervention periods greatly reduces risk adjusted profits 
(Sharpe ratio, see Sharpe 1994). These findings were generally confirmed by 
subsequent studies (see Neely and Weller, 2001; Neely, 2003; Sapp, 2004). Although 
this explanation is not relevant for our study, nevertheless worth mentioning. 
In terms of Order flow, the Brock et al. (1992) study shows predicative power in 
support and resistance levels, moreover, Osler in 2003 complements their study by 
concluding that trends reverse at predictable stop loss and take profit orders, which are 
usually around round numbers, and there is a rapid cross the support or resistance level 
that can be identified ex-ante. Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) provide a similar 
explanation for support and resistance levels by estimating limit order books and 
analyzing the relation to support and resistance. Data suggests that these are positively 
and statistically significantly correlated. They also illustrate that signals from dual cross 
moving average rules, correspond to a shift in quoted prices, that is, moving average 
signals appear to uncover information about the ‘skewness’ of liquidity between the two 
sides of the limit order book.  
As mentioned in previews sections, technical trading rules were generating positive 
economic profits before 1990, however, there was a decline in the subsequent years. 
Such results may be explained by temporary market inefficiencies in periods before the 
1990s. There are two possible explanations for the temporary inefficiencies. The first is 
the self-destructive nature of technical trading rules, explained by Timmermann and 
Granger (2004). As these methods become more widely used, technical information 
may get incorporated into prices and will cease succeed. Marquering et al., (2006) 
demonstrates that after they were documented in the academic literature, market 
anomalies in the stock market attenuate disappear or reverse, which goes along with the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. The second possible explanation is structural change in 
markets. With the rise of electronic trading and with the advent of discount brokerage 
firms has lowered transaction costs and increased liquidity in many markets (see 
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Sullivan et al., 1999), which increases the speed of market price movements, and 
reduced the profitability of technical trading rules. 
Risk Premiums can also constitute another explanation for the technical trading rules 
profits, as they are not perfect. For example, in order to see if technical trading returns 
are abnormal on a risk-adjusted basis, (1) Sharpe ratios of technical trading rules are 
often compared to a buy-and-hold strategy. However, Sharpe ratio penalizes the 
variability of profitable returns exactly the same as the variability of losses, i.e. the 
standard deviation. Another risk adjusted performance that is provided and also widely 
used by academic is the (2) CAPM. It assumes a constant risk premium over time. The 
CAPM is also known to have a joint hypothesis problem. Against this limitation, Taylor 
(1992) investigated whether returns on a portfolio of optimal technical trading rules in 
the foreign exchange futures markets are compensation for bearing time-varying risk 
premiums, but he finds that time varying risk premiums cannot explain excess returns.  
Market Micro structures deficiencies is an also a common explanation. For example: 
transaction costs generally consist of two components: (1) brokerage commissions and 
fees and (2) bid–ask spreads. While commissions and fees are observable, data for bid–
ask spreads have not been widely available until recent years. The study that 
demonstrates transaction cost impact for technical traders was performed by Greer et al. 
(1992), which reports that execution costs average about $40 per trade, on transaction of 
a commodity futures funds in the mid-eighties, which are much larger than cost 
estimates based on statistical bid–ask estimators. Other market Micro structures factors 
that may affect technical trading returns are non-synchronous trading and daily price 
limits. One common assumption is that investors’ trades are executed at closing prices 
on the day when trading signals are generated. Also, depending on the market, short 
selling techniques may not be allowed, or have higher financial costs than estimated. 
Against this problem Israel and Moskowitz (2013) show that long-only make up 60% of 
the momentum profits, making these strategies relevant, even in the absence of short 
selling techniques. 
Finally, another high common explanation is the data snooping bias. According to 
White (2000, p, 1097) “[…] data snooping occurs when a given set of data is used more 
than once for purposes of inference or model selection”. When this occurs, any results 
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may be spurious because they could be obtained just by chance, for example in data 
snooping results in overstated significance levels for conventional hypothesis tests, 
which can lead to incorrect statistical inference (see Denton, 1985; and Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990). In other words, trading rules have been investigated over time. Some 
rules may produce abnormal returns by chance even though they do not possess genuine 
forecasting power.  
2.5. Iberian related studies 
Euronext Lisbon Stock exchange and Madrid Stock Exchange were created in 1769 and 
1831, respectively. At the end of June 2015 there was a total of 200 companies quoted 
on both exchanges. Despite the low number of companies, there was previews attempt 
to test market efficiency in both markets. 
As noted by Yague and Gomez-Sala (2005), the Spanish stock exchange is a pure order-
driven market with no market makers. Fernandez-Rodriguez et. al (2000) investigates 
the profitability technical trading rule based on Artificial Neural Networks to the 
Madrid General Stock Index. Their results suggest that in a bear or stable market the 
technical trading rule is superior to a buy-and-hold but not in a bull market. However 
they did not consider trading costs. 
Matilla-Garcia (2006) applies a simple trading rule based upon genetic algorithms to 
investigate the main Spanish stock market index, IBEX-35, in four different sample 
periods from 1990 to 1999. The results suggest that, in general, the profitability of the 
simple trading rule is superior to the buy-and-hold strategy, refuting the hypothesis of 
efficient market in the Spanish Stock Exchange. Though, similar to Fernandez-
Rodriguez et. al (2000), they did not consider for transaction costs or risk.  
More recently, Metghalchi et. al (2015) tested Moving Average, Relative Strength 
Index, Moving Average Convergence Divergence, and trading breakout rules in the 
Madrid general stock index. After accounting for transaction costs and risk, their results 
show that technical trading rules are always superior to a buy-and-hold, even 
considering risk and transaction costs. 
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In the Portuguese case, Afonso and Texeira (1999), the first ones to test efficiency in the 
Portuguese market, and by implementing a non-linear dependence they concluded that 
abnormal returns were possible. These results were corroborated by Soares and Serra 
(2005) and Lobão and Lopes (2014) which verified the existence of momentum 
strategies’ profitability in short-term horizons, still, they did not consider transaction 
costs. 
Pereira (2011) by using exponential moving average, RSI and Bollinger bands 
concluded that these strategies produce higher returns than a buy-and-hold strategy, 
even after transaction costs. These results were aligned with Osório (2010), which used 
Relative Strength Indicator and MACD strategies and shows that Relative Strength 
Indicator was not able to beat the buy-and-hold while MACD was able to. 
More recently, Fernandes (2015) studied if certain stock characteristics (like size, 
liquidity, volatility and the stock´s industry) have a relevant influence on its results in 
the Portuguese stock market. He found that the technical analysis based investing 
models are not always statistically profitable, but, when they are, they produce 
substantial profits. This profitability may be more evident in less liquid and more 
volatile stocks; however, there is no evidence to any industry or size bias. 
On the other side we have Griffin et al (2003) which also considered Portugal in their 
international sample; however, their results suggest market efficiency. This hypothesis 
was corroborated by Nascimento (2007), which shows that prices follow a random 
walk. 
Borges (2008) and Vaz (2012) also tested the weak form of market efficiency on the 
Portuguese and Spanish markets, among others. By using a serial correlation test and a 
strategy based on the k-NN and Neural Network predictions, respectively, both reached 
the same conclusion: they did not reject the possibility of efficient markets in the 
Spanish market indexes but they rejected it in the Portuguese Market index. 
Overall in both, Portuguese and Spanish, markets the mixed results still persists, 
however, it shows signs of more efficiency in the Spanish market but not as much in the 
Portuguese stock market. Although there are studies, which use technical trading rules 
on both of these markets, these studies do not consider neither the effect of transaction 
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costs among different investors, nor the effects of short selling constrains on these 
profits. 
The heated debate that surrounds the technical analysis profitability and the efficiency 
of the Iberian Stock Exchange, as well as, the lack of studies regarding transaction costs 
and short selling contains on these profits justifies, per si, the realization of this study. 
3. Methodology 
This study intends to answer three hypotheses: (1) testing market efficiency of the 
Portuguese and Spanish Stock Markets at its weaker form; (2) retail investor can still 
earn abnormal returns by using simple technical trading rules and (3) these profits still 
persist if we consider short selling constrains. By testing these three hypotheses we are 
extending the literature on these markets, as well as, giving more insights as how these 
markets work. 
3.1. Data 
To do so, we will use the DataStream database to analyse the adjusted prices of 185 
Portuguese and Spanish stocks, see Appendix 1 for a complete detailed list. Thereby, 
we obtained the stock prices adjusted for stock splits, dividends and right issues. We 
also gather the Market Capitalization; SIC Code
1
 and Beta
2
 for those stocks. We only 
considered alive
3
 stocks and with at least 300 days of trading, therefore we excluded 
some companies, see Appendix 2 for more information. In terms of Market 
Capitalization and Beta, there were some data flaws, especially in companies which 
entered in the market recently. In order to overcome this limitation, we have considered 
that stocks with missing data have a Beta or Market Capitalization equal to the average 
                                                 
1
 We only considered first two digits from SIC Code due to the reduced number of companies. 
2
 According to the Datastream Definitions Guide, “the beta factor is derived by performing a least squares 
regression between adjusted prices of the stock and the corresponding Datastream market index. The 
historic beta so derived is then adjusted using Bayesian techniques to predict the probable behaviour of 
the stock price on the basis that any extreme behaviour in the past is likely to average out in the future. 
This adjusted value, or "forecast" beta, is represented by the BETA datatype. The Datastream beta factor 
is calculated using stock prices and market indices as the only variables”. 
3
 Stocks that were tradable by the end of the period considered. Disregarding mergers, public offerings, 
bankruptcy, suspension, among other possible causes. 
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of the sample. As for our consideration of the risk free asset, we extracted Euro Spot 3 
month EURIBOR. 
While several studies found that technical analysis was more profitable during a crisis, 
in this study, we will focus on a post-crisis environment, which starts on the 1
st
 July 
2009
4
, and we extended the sample to 30
th
 June 2015, giving a total of 1565 
observations for each stock. 
3.2. Simple Technical Trading Rules 
There are many types of technical analysis used by practitioners, but broadly speaking 
we can distinguish two types to distinguish trends and reversals: charting and 
mechanical. While charting is a very subjective system that requires practitioners to use 
judgement and skills in finding patterns, such as head and shoulders, triangles, 
resistance and support levels, the mechanical impose discipline and consistency on the 
practitioner in order to follow rules based on mathematical functions of past data, i.e. 
indicators. As mentioned in the last section they can be simple (e.g. moving averages) to 
very complex models, in this work we will be focused in the following on the simple 
technical trading systems. 
While the simple return of an asset on a day t, is given by: 
𝑅′ =  
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
− 1      (3.1) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the adjusted close price on day t. Another definition of asset return is the 
continuously compounded or log return on a day t, which is given by 
𝑅 =  ln (
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
)                                                     (3.2) 
where ln is the natural logarithmic function. This second definition of asset return is the 
one used throughout the rest of this paper. 
 
                                                 
4
 Defined by Narayan et al (2015). 
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3.2.1. Filter Rules 
The simplest trading strategy, where technical analysts set rules for when to buy and sell 
investments, based on percentage changes in price from previous lows and highs. This 
system was first introduced by Alexander (1961 and 1964) and tested by numerous 
academics. This system generates a buy (sell) signal when today’s closing price rises 
(falls) by x% above (below) its most recent low (high). Moves less than x percent in 
either direction are ignored. 
Lower x% will lead to higher transaction costs due to extensive trading methods. In this 
work we choose to use filter rules at the level of 0.5%, 1% and 1.5%, the most 
profitable filter rules given by Fama and Blume (1986).  
3.2.2. Moving Average Crossover 
The signal from a dual moving average (MA) crossover occurs when a short-term 
average crosses through a long-term average. As the method is being quite objective 
and easy to use, it has been widely used by practitioners (e.g. Taylor and Allen 1992; 
Lui and Mole 1998; and Rocha, 2014). While there are a number of possibilities in 
terms of moving averages, for example exponential moving average or smooth moving 
average, in this work we choose to use the simple moving average crossover: 
𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑡 =  
1
𝑠
× ∑ 𝑃𝑐𝑡−𝑖+1
𝑠
𝑖=1 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑠    (3.3) 
𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑡 =  
1
𝑙
× ∑ 𝑃𝑐𝑡−𝑗+1
𝑙
𝑗=1 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑙    (3.4) 
where 𝑙 > 𝑠; and 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑡and 𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑡are the short and long moving average in the period t 
of s and l days, respectively.  
A buy (sell) signals when the short moving average is above (below) the long moving 
average by an amount larger than the band. Band (y) is an input restriction in order to 
avoid false signals, i.e., to eliminate ‘whiplash’ that may generate fake trading signals 
without the support of a solid underlying trend. Variables of consideration are the 
number of days of the SMA (s), number of days of LMA (l) and band (y). This will be 
represented as MA (s, l, y). The most popular rules indicated by Brock et al. (1992) is 
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the 1-200-0 and 1-50-1, in our study, we choose to follow the methodology similar to 
them with some additions: where s can vary between 1, 5 or 25; l can vary between 50, 
100 or 200 and bands from 0%, 1% and 2%. 
3.2.3. Relative Strength Indicator 
The Relative Strength Index (RSI) was developed by Wilder (1978) and is an extremely 
popular momentum indicator that has been featured in a number of articles and books 
over the years (e.g. Brown 1999). RSI varies between the values of 0 and 100, which 
identifies oversold (near 0) and overbought (near 100) positions. Its calculation is 
divided into two parts. First, we calculate the first Up Closes (UC) and Down Closes 
(DC): 
𝑈𝐶𝑡 = 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡 − 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡−1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡 > 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡−1     (3.5) 
𝐷𝐶𝑡 = −(𝑃
𝑐
𝑡 − 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡−1, ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡 < 𝑃
𝑐
𝑡−1    (3.6) 
Followed by its averages, which takes different calculation after the first period and the 
following periods: 
𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡 =
1
𝑛
× ∑ 𝑈𝐶𝑡−𝑘+1
𝑛
𝑘=1  , 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛    (3.7) 
𝐴𝐷𝐶𝑡 =
1
𝑛
× ∑ 𝐷𝐶𝑡−𝑘+1
𝑛
𝑘=1  , 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛     (3.8) 
𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡+1 = [𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡 × (𝑛 − 1) + 𝑈𝐶𝑡+1] ×
1
𝑛
    (3.9) 
𝐴𝐷𝐶𝑡+1 = [𝐴𝐷𝐶𝑡 × (𝑛 − 1) + 𝐷𝐶𝑡+1] ×
1
𝑛
    (3.10) 
RSI(k) is computed as follows: 
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡 = 100 −
100
(1+
𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝐷𝐶𝑡
)
     (3.11) 
Another input that can be different for each investor is the Entry Threshold. We will use 
the number proposed by Wilder in 1978: 30. The strategy can be explained as the 
following: 
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𝐺𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑡+1 𝑖𝑓:  𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡−1 < 30 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡 > 30  (3.12) 
𝐺𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑡+1 𝑖𝑓:  𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡−1 > 70 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑡 < 70  (3.13) 
The RSI is most typically used on a 14-day timeframe; however, in this work we choose 
to extend the timeframe to 12-days, 14-days and 16-days. 
3.2.4. Bollinger bands 
First introduced by Bollinger in the beginning of 1980, this indicator can be seen as an 
extension to a simple moving average and it is one of the few simple indicators which 
uses volatility. It is composed by two volatility bands, one above and one below its 
moving average. According to its author, the bands should contain 88-89% of the price 
moves. Therefore, we will have the following three bands: 
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑: 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑡 =  
1
𝑠
× ∑ 𝑃𝑐𝑡−𝑖+1
𝑠
𝑖=1 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑠  (3.14) 
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑: 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑡 + ( 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 × 2) (3.15) 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑: 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑡 − ( 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣 × 2) (3.16) 
A buy (sell) signal occurs when the price crosses above (below) the upper (lower) band. 
In this work we will use an extension to the Bollinger methodology. In his work he 
defines the number of days to be 20, and we choose to extend the study to 15, 20 and 25 
day periods. 
3.3. Bootstrap test 
When a large number of trading rules is considered, it is a statistical procedure to use a 
bootstrap methodology to test the statistical significance of its profits. We perform a 
bootstrap approach similar to Okunev and White (2003). This bootstrap method 
randomly replaces observations with its mean in order to generate a new data set; so the 
original characteristics of the original data set are still preserved. This process is 
repeated 1000 times for each strategy. We take the average of those simulations and we 
test it if it is different from zero, and a p-value is created for each strategy. In our work 
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we used a 5% confidence level, therefore if a p-value is less than 0.05 it means the 
strategy profits are statistically different from zero.  
3.4. Market Conditions 
Park and Irwin (2007) emphasize the importance of transaction costs on the studies 
related with technical analysis trading rules profitability. They state that these costs 
generally consist of brokerage commissions and bid-ask spreads. While commissions 
can be negligible, at about $20 for several thousand shares for US stock markets (see 
Caginalp and Laurent, 1998), transaction costs arising from the bid-ask spread cannot 
be ignored.  
A study performed by Antão et. al (2004) found that the average bid-ask spread for the 
Portuguese and Spanish stock index is 0.60% and 0.24%, respectively, while 
commissions were 4.11 and 5.50 basis points, respectively. However these costs may 
differentiate depending on the investor and stock. Institutional investors will have fewer 
costs than retail investors due to economies of scale. The liquidity of the stock has also 
an impact where the bid-ask spread is higher for less liquid stock. Given this 
information we will assume different transaction costs: 0.30%, 0.65% and 1.00% round 
trip costs, to check if they change the outcome of these strategies significantly. 
Another market condition that we will explore is the short selling constrains. In the first 
instance we will calculate the profitability of these strategies with the ability to short 
sell without incurring in extra financial costs and then with those constrains, as they are 
present in some of the Iberian stock markets. If the investor has short selling constrains, 
he/she will invest in the risk free asset, represented by the Euro Spot 3 month 
EURIBOR, until a positive signal appears. 
The investor will not be an intraday investor, which means that he/she enters and exits 
in the market at the day’s closing price, when our model produces its signs. Also, the 
investor won’t set any stop losses or take profit orders. He/she will simply liquidate its 
positions or enter a new one once a signal appears. At the end of our data sample, our 
investor will exit any open trade, liquidating its positions. We will explore a total of 
39,960 strategies. 
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4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we will present the empirical results of the strategies presented in the 
previous section. We will be comparing each strategy results to the average Buy and 
Hold, as we have considered an equal weight portfolio. During this period the Buy and 
Hold achieved a negative return of -0.024%, with a 3.1% standard deviation, resulting 
in a negative Sharpe Ratio of -0.001. 
4.1. Relative Strength Indicator and Filter Rules 
Our analysis showed us evidence of efficient markets with the use of RSI and Filter 
Rules, see table 1. Even though the B&H strategy reproduced negative returns, these 
indicators reported even worse returns. These results do not differ much from short 
selling constrains, and even taking into consideration low transaction costs.  
  
With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
RSI (12) mean -0.040% -0.044% -0.048% -0.031% -0.033% -0.034% 
 
std. 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 
 
s.r. -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 
RSI (14) mean -0.040% -0.043% -0.045% -0.030% -0.032% -0.033% 
 
std. 2.959% 2.959% 2.960% 2.203% 2.204% 2.204% 
 
s.r. -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
RSI (16) mean -0.034% -0.037% -0.039% -0.028% -0.029% -0.030% 
 
std. 2.946% 2.947% 2.947% 2.110% 2.110% 2.111% 
 
s.r. -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
F.R. (0.5%) mean -0.195% -0.297% -0.399% -0.109% -0.160% -0.211% 
 
std. 3.031% 3.045% 3.069% 2.059% 2.073% 2.096% 
 
s.r. -0.054 -0.098 -0.140 -0.039 -0.071 -0.101 
F.R. (1.0%) mean -0.189% -0.267% -0.345% -0.106% -0.145% -0.184% 
 
std. 3.030% 3.042% 3.062% 2.077% 2.088% 2.105% 
 
s.r. -0.049 -0.080 -0.111 -0.035 -0.058 -0.080 
F.R. (1.5%) mean -0.179% -0.238% -0.298% -0.101% -0.130% -0.160% 
 
std. 3.028% 3.038% 3.054% 2.084% 2.093% 2.106% 
 
s.r. -0.043 -0.065 -0.088 -0.031 -0.047 -0.063 
Table 2 – Relative Strength Indicator and Filter Rules results 
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These results do not differ from Pereira (2011) and Fernandes (2015), but go against 
Metghalchi (2015) outcomes. This can be explained by the application of a different 
strategy by the author, as there were two strategies regarding the RSI: (1) buy if RSI > 
50 and sell otherwise; and (2) RSI crossover with its 20-day moving average; both were 
profitable. 
Regarding the Filter Rules the negative profitability can be explained due to the high 
number of signals, resulting in high transaction costs. 
4.2. Bollinger Bands 
Our analysis showed us mixed evidence of efficient markets with the use of Bollinger 
Bands, see table 2. 
  
With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
BB (15) mean 0.009% 0.002% -0.005% -0.005% -0.009% -0.012% 
 
std. 0.0302 0.0302 0.0302 0.0198 0.0198 0.0199 
 
s.r. 0.002** -0.001 -0.005 -0.001* -0.003 -0.006 
BB (20) mean 0.020% 0.014% 0.008% 0.000% -0.003% -0.006% 
 
std. 3.010% 3.012% 3.014% 1.981% 1.981% 1.983% 
 
s.r. 0.006** 0.003** 0.000** 0.003** 0.000** -0.002 
BB (25) mean 0.022% 0.017% 0.011% 0.000% -0.002% -0.005% 
 
std. 3.010% 3.012% 3.014% 1.967% 1.968% 1.969% 
 
s.r. 0.008** 0.005** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001** -0.001* 
* - Beat average B&H but below 0. 
** - Beat average B&H and above 0. 
Table 2 – Bollinger Bands results 
In this case, positive results are achievable, however it’s largely influenced by 
transaction costs and the ability of short selling the stock.  
Investors with short selling abilities have better overall results, but are still influenced 
by transaction costs. As we can see in table 3 and 5, results suggest a better performance 
of this technical trading rule over more volatile stocks (higher betas), as well as smaller 
capitalization firms. They also seems to have a sector bias: better performance in 
Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade and Services. While low cap and high beta findings go 
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along with Fernandes (2015) results; the sector bias goes against his findings. In case of 
geography Portugal seems to have better Sharpe Ratios. The bootstrap critical values, 
shown in table 4 and 6, suggests that in majority these profits are statistical different 
from zero.  
Both of these indicators, BB(20) and BB(25), are also in alignment with the findings of 
Pereira (2011), where it was found that BB(20) had an average annual return of 11.65%, 
beating the Buy and Hold strategy. 
 
With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0291** 0.0269** 0.0248** 0.0024** 0.0006** -0.0012* 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0043** 0.0014** -0.0014* -0.0023* -0.0045* -0.0067* 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0029* -0.0004 -0.0038 0.0036** 0.0009 -0.0017 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0049** 0.0022** -0.0005* 0.0024** 0.0004** -0.0017 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0045 0.0046 0.0025 0.0004 
Large Cap
5
  -0.0124 -0.0166 -0.0208 -0.0019 -0.0052 -0.0085 
Mid Cap  -0.0061 -0.0100 -0.0138 -0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0065 
Small Cap  0.0115 0.0081 0.0047 0.0173** 0.0147** 0.0122 
Micro Cap 0.0120** 0.0100** 0.0080** -0.0009* -0.0024* -0.0039* 
Construction 0.0019** -0.0010* -0.0038* -0.0013* -0.0034 -0.0055 
Finance 0.0000* -0.0041 -0.0079 -0.0060* -0.0094 -0.0127 
Manufacturing 0.0072** 0.0044** 0.0016** 0.0054** 0.0034** 0.0014** 
Retail Trade 0.0084** 0.0047 0.0010 0.0109** 0.0080** 0.0051 
Wholesale Trade 0.0276** 0.0257** 0.0239** 0.0112** 0.0099** 0.0085** 
Transportation 0.0012** -0.0021 -0.0053 0.0005** -0.0020 -0.0045 
Services 0.0107** 0.0089** 0.0071** 0.0061** 0.0048** 0.0034** 
Spain 0.0053** 0.0021** -0.0011 0.0035** 0.0010** -0.0014 
Portugal 0.0070** 0.0049** 0.0028** 0.0004** -0.0013* -0.0030* 
Total 0.0058** 0.0029** 0.0000** 0.0026** 0.0003** -0.0019 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 3 – Bollinger Bands (20) Sharpe Ratio results. 
  
                                                 
5
 Large Cap  [10B;200B[; Mid Cap [2B;10B[; Small Cap [300M;2B[; Micro Cap [0;300M[, values in 
Euros. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 100.0% 89.5% 94.7% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 96.6% 100.0% 86.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 95.7% 95.7% 93.5% 93.5% 97.8% 97.8% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 92.5% 95.0% 97.5% 97.5% 100.0% 97.5% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 94.0% 96.0% 92.0% 96.0% 98.0% 96.0% 
Large Cap 93.8% 100.0% 93.8% 100.0% 93.8% 100.0% 
Mid Cap  97.6% 95.1% 90.2% 97.6% 97.6% 100.0% 
Small Cap 88.6% 94.3% 88.6% 97.1% 100.0% 94.3% 
Micro Cap 95.7% 96.8% 95.7% 95.7% 97.8% 96.8% 
Construction 78.9% 89.5% 89.5% 94.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Finance 100.0% 100.0% 96.8% 93.5% 96.8% 96.8% 
Manufacturing 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 98.2% 98.2% 98.2% 
Retail Trade 100.0% 100.0% 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 93.1% 96.6% 89.7% 100.0% 96.6% 89.7% 
Services 97.3% 97.3% 91.9% 97.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
Spain 93.8% 96.2% 91.5% 96.2% 97.7% 98.5% 
Portugal 96.4% 96.4% 96.4% 98.2% 98.2% 94.5% 
Total 94.6% 96.2% 93.0% 96.8% 97.8% 97.3% 
Table 4 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for BB(20). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0295** 0.0276** 0.0257** 0.0027** 0.0011** -0.0005* 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0063** 0.0039** 0.0015** -0.0013* -0.0032* -0.0050* 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0087** 0.0058** 0.0030** 0.0067** 0.0044** 0.0022** 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0034** 0.0010** -0.0014 -0.0001* -0.0019 -0.0037 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0038 0.0013 -0.0011 0.0052 0.0033 0.0015 
Large Cap  -0.0138 -0.0174 -0.0210 -0.0034 -0.0063 -0.0092 
Mid Cap 0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0064 0.0024 -0.0002 -0.0029 
Small Cap  0.0154** 0.0125** 0.0097 0.0188** 0.0166** 0.0145** 
Micro Cap  0.0123** 0.0106** 0.0088* -0.0013* -0.0026* -0.0040* 
Construction 0.0040** 0.0016** -0.0008* -0.0021* -0.0039 -0.0057 
Finance 0.0054** 0.0020** -0.0013* -0.0033* -0.0061* -0.0089 
Manufacturing 0.0074** 0.0050** 0.0026** 0.0045** 0.0027** 0.0009** 
Retail Trade 0.0092** 0.0058** 0.0023 0.0098** 0.0070** 0.0043 
Wholesale Trade 0.0263** 0.0247** 0.0230** 0.0093** 0.0080** 0.0068** 
Transportation  0.0055** 0.0027** -0.0001* 0.0031** 0.0010** -0.0012 
Services 0.0124** 0.0108** 0.0092** 0.0070** 0.0059** 0.0047** 
Spain 0.0075** 0.0048** 0.0021** 0.0045** 0.0024** 0.0003** 
Portugal 0.0091** 0.0072** 0.0053** 0.0000** -0.0015* -0.0029* 
Total 0.0080** 0.0055** 0.0030** 0.0032** 0.0012** -0.0007* 
Table 5 – Bollinger Bands (25) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 94.7% 100.0% 94.7% 100.0% 84.2% 84.2% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 89.7% 93.1% 96.6% 89.7% 93.1% 100.0% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 93.5% 93.5% 93.5% 91.3% 91.3% 93.5% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 95.0% 97.5% 97.5% 95.0% 100.0% 97.5% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 92.0% 98.0% 100.0% 94.0% 98.0% 98.0% 
Large Cap 93.8% 100.0% 100.0% 93.8% 93.8% 93.8% 
Mid Cap  92.7% 95.1% 95.1% 90.2% 92.7% 90.2% 
Small Cap 88.6% 94.3% 91.4% 91.4% 88.6% 94.3% 
Micro Cap 94.6% 96.8% 98.9% 95.7% 97.8% 98.9% 
Construction 84.2% 94.7% 94.7% 89.5% 89.5% 94.7% 
Finance 96.8% 96.8% 96.8% 96.8% 87.1% 90.3% 
Manufacturing 94.7% 98.2% 98.2% 93.0% 96.5% 98.2% 
Retail Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 93.1% 96.6% 100.0% 93.1% 96.6% 96.6% 
Services 89.2% 91.9% 91.9% 94.6% 97.3% 94.6% 
Spain 91.5% 96.2% 96.9% 92.3% 93.8% 94.6% 
Portugal 96.4% 96.4% 96.4% 96.4% 96.4% 98.2% 
Total 93.0% 96.2% 96.8% 93.5% 94.6% 95.7% 
Table 6 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for BB (25). 
4.3. Moving Averages 
The results from the moving averages strategies are also mixed, dependant on its inputs, 
see table 7. On some specific cases, Moving Averages strategies had better Sharpe 
Ratios then the previous results, but it is still present the influence from transaction 
costs and from short selling constrains. This explains why the moving averages 
strategies were the most popular among investors in Portugal (see Rocha, 2014). 
The most popular MA combination, as indicated in Brock et al. (1992), is the MA 
(1,200,0) and the MA(1,50,1), which in this period does not beat the buy and hold. 
These results suggest that markets are self-corrective.  
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
MA (1,50,0) mean -0.09% -0.11% -0.13% -0.05% -0.07% -0.08% 
 
std. 2.91% 2.92% 2.93% 1.84% 1.84% 1.85% 
 
s.r. -0.017 -0.027 -0.037 -0.015 -0.023 -0.030 
MA (1,100,0) mean -0.06% -0.07% -0.09% -0.04% -0.04% -0.05% 
 
std. 2.85% 2.85% 2.86% 1.78% 1.79% 1.79% 
 
s.r. -0.007 -0.014 -0.021 -0.009 -0.014 -0.019 
MA (1,200,0) mean -0.05% -0.06% -0.07% -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% 
 
std. 2.62% 2.62% 2.63% 1.63% 1.64% 1.64% 
 
s.r. -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.007 -0.011 -0.014 
MA (5,50,0) mean -0.02% -0.03% -0.04% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% 
 
std. 2.91% 2.92% 2.92% 1.83% 1.83% 1.84% 
 
s.r. -0.001 -0.007 -0.012 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 
MA (5,100,0) mean -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% 
 
std. 2.84% 2.85% 2.85% 1.75% 1.75% 1.76% 
 
s.r. 0.003** -0.001* -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 
MA (5,200,0) mean -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 
 
std. 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 1.58% 1.58% 1.58% 
 
s.r. 0.003** 0.001** -0.001* 0.000* -0.002 -0.003 
MA (25,50,0) mean 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 
 
std. 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 1.74% 1.74% 1.74% 
 
s.r. 0.006** 0.003** 0.000* 0.002** -0.001* -0.003 
MA (25,100,0) mean 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.82% 2.82% 2.82% 1.73% 1.73% 1.73% 
 
s.r. 0.010** 0.008** 0.006** 0.004** 0.003** 0.001** 
MA (25,200,0) mean 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.46% 2.46% 2.47% 1.53% 1.53% 1.54% 
 
s.r. 0.006** 0.005** 0.004** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 
MA (1,50,1) mean -0.07% -0.08% -0.09% -0.05% -0.05% -0.06% 
 
std. 2.96% 2.96% 2.97% 1.88% 1.88% 1.88% 
 
s.r. -0.007 -0.012 -0.017 -0.008 -0.012 -0.016 
MA (1,100,1) mean -0.05% -0.06% -0.07% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04% 
 
std. 2.88% 2.88% 2.89% 1.79% 1.79% 1.79% 
 
s.r. -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.008 -0.011 
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MA (1,200,1) mean -0.05% -0.05% -0.06% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% 
 
std. 2.65% 2.65% 2.65% 1.61% 1.61% 1.62% 
 
s.r. -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 
MA (5,50,1) mean -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% 
 
std. 2.96% 2.96% 2.97% 1.86% 1.86% 1.87% 
 
s.r. 0.004** 0.001* -0.002 0.001** -0.002 -0.004 
MA (5,100,1) mean -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% 
 
std. 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 1.76% 1.76% 1.76% 
 
s.r. 0.004** 0.002** 0.000** 0.000* -0.002 -0.004 
MA (5,200,1) mean 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 
 
std. 2.62% 2.62% 2.62% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 
 
s.r. 0.005 0.004** 0.002** 0.001** 0.000** -0.001* 
MA (25,50,1) mean 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.95% 2.95% 2.96% 1.84% 1.85% 1.85% 
 
s.r. 0.008** 0.006** 0.004** 0.003** 0.001** 0.000* 
MA (25,100,1) mean 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.85% 2.85% 2.85% 1.73% 1.73% 1.73% 
 
s.r. 0.008** 0.007** 0.006** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 
MA (25,200,1) mean 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 1.51% 1.51% 1.51% 
 
s.r. 0.006** 0.005** 0.004** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 
MA (1,50,2) mean -0.06% -0.06% -0.07% -0.04% -0.04% -0.05% 
 
std. 2.96% 2.96% 2.97% 1.88% 1.88% 1.88% 
 
s.r. -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.010 
MA (1,100,2) mean -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% 
 
std. 2.99% 2.99% 2.99% 3.02% 3.02% 3.02% 
 
s.r. -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
MA (1,200,2) mean -0.04% -0.04% -0.05% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% 
 
std. 2.66% 2.67% 2.67% 1.61% 1.61% 1.62% 
 
s.r. 0.000** -0.001* -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 
MA (5,50,2) mean 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% 
 
std. 2.96% 2.96% 2.96% 1.87% 1.87% 1.87% 
 
s.r. 0.006** 0.003** 0.001** 0.002** 0.000* -0.002 
MA (5,100,2) mean 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 
 
std. 2.88% 2.88% 2.88% 1.77% 1.77% 1.77% 
 
s.r. 0.005** 0.004** 0.002** 0.001** -0.001* -0.002 
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MA (5,200,2) mean 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 
 
std. 2.63% 2.63% 2.64% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 
 
s.r. 0.005** 0.004** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 0.000** 
MA (25,50,2) mean 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.98% 2.98% 2.98% 1.83% 1.83% 1.83% 
 
s.r. 0.007** 0.006** 0.004** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 
MA (25,100,2) mean 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.85% 2.85% 2.85% 1.72% 1.72% 1.73% 
 
s.r. 0.008** 0.007** 0.006** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 
MA (25,200,2) mean 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
std. 2.54% 2.54% 2.54% 1.52% 1.52% 1.52% 
 
s.r. 0.006** 0.005** 0.005** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 
* - Beat average B&H but below 0. 
** - Beat average B&H and above 0. 
Table 7 – Moving Averages results. 
The results are similar with the Bollinger Bands, however, they are more influenced by 
the transaction costs, as Bollinger Bands takes the volatility of the stock into account. 
In order to see if these profits are predominant in any type of stock we will continue to 
look further into the detail of combination, which outperformed the buy-and hold 
strategy in every market condition. Table 8 through 23 will demonstrate us this 
information complemented by the bootstrap tests for each combination. 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0230** 0.0218** 0.0206** 0.0004** -0.0007* -0.0018* 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0086** 0.0070** 0.0054** 0.0019** 0.0006** -0.0007* 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0050** 0.0030** 0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0029 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0087** 0.0072** 0.0057** 0.0049** 0.0038** 0.0027** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0107** 0.0088** 0.0070** 0.0097** 0.0083** 0.0070** 
Large Cap  0.0096 0.0073 0.0050 0.0148 0.0131 0.0114 
Mid Cap 0.0139** 0.0117** 0.0095** 0.0091** 0.0074** 0.0058** 
Small Cap  0.0109 0.0088 0.0067 0.0144** 0.0129** 0.0114 
Micro Cap  0.0075** 0.0063** 0.0050** -0.0041* -0.0050* -0.0060* 
Construction 0.0070** 0.0054** 0.0038** 0.0047** 0.0035** 0.0022** 
Finance 0.0097** 0.0073** 0.0049** -0.0041* -0.0059* -0.0076 
Manufacturing 0.0075** 0.0058** 0.0041** 0.0036** 0.0023** 0.0011** 
Retail Trade 0.0110** 0.0087** 0.0064 0.0075** 0.0058 0.0040 
Wholesale Trade 0.0180** 0.0171** 0.0163** 0.0038** 0.0032** 0.0026** 
Transportation  0.0100** 0.0082** 0.0064** 0.0040** 0.0027** 0.0013** 
Services 0.0132** 0.0120** 0.0109** 0.0103** 0.0095** 0.0086** 
Spain 0.0104** 0.0085** 0.0066** 0.0073** 0.0059** 0.0045** 
Portugal 0.0083** 0.0070** 0.0056** -0.0038* -0.0049* -0.0059* 
Total 0.0098** 0.0080** 0.0063** 0.0040** 0.0027** 0.0014** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 8 – Moving Average (25,100,0) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 100.0% 94.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 93.1% 86.2% 93.1% 96.6% 96.6% 100.0% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 97.8% 100.0% 97.8% 100.0% 95.7% 97.8% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 95.0% 100.0% 97.5% 97.5% 97.5% 95.0% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 98.0% 100.0% 98.0% 98.0% 100.0% 96.0% 
Large Cap 93.8% 87.5% 93.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Mid Cap  100.0% 97.6% 97.6% 97.6% 95.1% 97.6% 
Small Cap 91.4% 97.1% 94.3% 97.1% 100.0% 97.1% 
Micro Cap 97.8% 98.9% 98.9% 98.9% 97.8% 96.8% 
Construction 89.5% 94.7% 94.7% 100.0% 94.7% 94.7% 
Finance 96.8% 96.8% 96.8% 100.0% 96.8% 100.0% 
Manufacturing 98.2% 98.2% 100.0% 100.0% 98.2% 96.5% 
Retail Trade 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 100.0% 100.0% 96.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Services 97.3% 94.6% 94.6% 94.6% 97.3% 94.6% 
Spain 95.4% 96.2% 96.2% 97.7% 97.7% 96.2% 
Portugal 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.2% 100.0% 
Total 96.8% 97.3% 97.3% 98.4% 97.8% 97.3% 
Table 9 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,100,0). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0180** 0.0173** 0.0166** 0.0037** 0.0031** 0.0025** 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.010**3 0.0094** 0.0086** 0.0067** 0.0059** 0.0052** 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ -0.0015 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0029 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0041** 0.0031** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0011** 0.0003** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0067** 0.0057 0.0046 0.0051 0.0044 0.0037 
Large Cap  0.0070 0.0056 0.0042 0.0150 0.0139 0.0129 
Mid Cap 0.0031 0.0019 0.0006 0.0074** 0.0064** 0.0055** 
Small Cap  0.0081 0.0070 0.0058 0.0130** 0.0121 0.0112 
Micro Cap  0.0058** 0.0051** 0.0044** -0.0048* -0.0054* -0.0061* 
Construction 0.0085** 0.0076** 0.0066** 0.0034** 0.0026** 0.0018** 
Finance 0.0068** 0.0056** 0.0044** 0.0034** 0.0027** 0.0018** 
Manufacturing 0.0050** 0.0041** 0.0031** 0.0019** 0.0011** 0.0004 
Retail Trade 0.0067** 0.0052 0.0037 0.0026 0.0014 0.0002 
Wholesale Trade 0.0170** 0.0165** 0.0160** 0.0096** 0.0092** 0.0089** 
Transportation  0.0060** 0.0049** 0.0037** 0.0052** 0.0043** 0.0034** 
Services 0.0028** 0.0021** 0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0007 0.0001 
Spain 0.0067** 0.0056** 0.0045** 0.0044** 0.0036** 0.0027** 
Portugal 0.0035** 0.0028** 0.0022** -0.0005* -0.0012* -0.0018* 
Total 0.0058** 0.0048** 0.0038** 0.0030** 0.0022** 0.0014 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 10 – Moving Average (25,200,0) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 89.5% 94.7% 89.5% 100.0% 100.0% 89.5% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 89.7% 96.6% 93.1% 89.7% 89.7% 93.1% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 95.7% 97.8% 95.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 92.5% 90.0% 87.5% 95.0% 90.0% 85.0% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 94.0% 92.0% 88.0% 94.0% 96.0% 94.0% 
Large Cap 93.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 93.8% 
Mid Cap  90.2% 92.7% 82.9% 97.6% 95.1% 95.1% 
Small Cap 97.1% 97.1% 94.3% 97.1% 100.0% 94.3% 
Micro Cap 92.5% 92.5% 91.4% 93.5% 92.5% 91.4% 
Construction 100.0% 94.7% 94.7% 89.5% 94.7% 94.7% 
Finance 90.3% 93.5% 93.5% 96.8% 96.8% 90.3% 
Manufacturing 94.7% 93.0% 87.7% 93.0% 91.2% 91.2% 
Retail Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 
Transportation 89.7% 93.1% 93.1% 100.0% 96.6% 93.1% 
Services 89.2% 94.6% 86.5% 100.0% 100.0% 97.3% 
Spain 91.5% 92.3% 90.0% 93.8% 93.1% 91.5% 
Portugal 96.4% 98.2% 92.7% 100.0% 100.0% 96.4% 
Total 93.0% 94.1% 90.8% 95.7% 95.1% 93.0% 
Table 11 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,200,0). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0238* 0.0227* 0.0216* -0.0007* -0.0017* -0.0026* 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0078** 0.0065* 0.0052* 0.0006** -0.0005* -0.0015* 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0015 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0026 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0082** 0.0069** 0.0056** 0.0041** 0.0031** 0.0022** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0088** 0.0075** 0.0062** 0.0093** 0.0084** 0.0074** 
Large Cap  0.0072 0.0054 0.0036 0.0120 0.0106 0.0092 
Mid Cap 0.0109** 0.0101** 0.0087** 0.0090** 0.0079** 0.0067** 
Small Cap  0.0076 0.0060 0.0043 0.0116 0.0104 0.0092 
Micro Cap  0.0074* 0.0064* 0.0053* -0.0038* -0.0046* -0.0054* 
Construction 0.0061** 0.0048** 0.0034** 0.0038** 0.0027** 0.0016** 
Finance 0.0075* 0.0059* 0.0042* -0.0019* -0.0031* -0.0043* 
Manufacturing 0.0049** 0.0036 0.0022 0.0013** 0.0002 -0.0008 
Retail Trade 0.0122** 0.0104 0.0086 0.0078** 0.0065 0.0053 
Wholesale Trade 0.0082** 0.0139** 0.0151** 0.0081** 0.0074** 0.0067** 
Transportation  0.0090** 0.0075** 0.0060** 0.0036** 0.0024** 0.0013** 
Services 0.0134** 0.0125** 0.0116** 0.0090** 0.0082** 0.0076** 
Spain 0.0089** 0.0074** 0.0059** 0.0055** 0.0044** 0.0033** 
Portugal 0.0066* 0.0062* 0.0053* -0.0018* -0.0026* -0.0034* 
Total 0.0082** 0.0070** 0.0057** 0.0033** 0.0023** 0.0013** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 12 – Moving Average (25,100,1) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 84.2% 94.7% 94.7% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 89.7% 93.1% 93.1% 89.7% 89.7% 89.7% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 91.3% 89.1% 93.5% 95.7% 95.7% 95.7% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 95.0% 92.5% 92.5% 95.0% 92.5% 95.0% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 98.0% 98.0% 98.0% 100.0% 100.0% 94.0% 
Large Cap 81.3% 81.3% 87.5% 93.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
Mid Cap  92.7% 90.2% 90.2% 95.1% 92.7% 92.7% 
Small Cap 97.1% 97.1% 97.1% 94.3% 94.3% 97.1% 
Micro Cap 95.7% 95.7% 96.8% 94.6% 95.7% 92.5% 
Construction 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 
Finance 93.5% 93.5% 87.1% 93.5% 93.5% 90.3% 
Manufacturing 94.7% 93.0% 100.0% 96.5% 96.5% 94.7% 
Retail Trade 100.0% 100.0% 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 80.0% 80.0% 
Transportation 86.2% 86.2% 89.7% 93.1% 96.6% 93.1% 
Services 97.3% 97.3% 97.3% 94.6% 94.6% 97.3% 
Spain 93.8% 93.1% 94.6% 94.6% 94.6% 93.1% 
Portugal 94.5% 94.5% 94.5% 94.5% 96.4% 96.4% 
Total 94.1% 93.5% 94.6% 94.6% 95.1% 94.1% 
Table 13 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,100,1). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0177** 0.0171** 0.0164** 0.0037** 0.0031** 0.0026** 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0076** 0.0068** 0.0060** 0.0045** 0.0038** 0.0031** 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0028 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0050** 0.0041** 0.0033** 0.0021** 0.0014** 0.0008** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0071** 0.0062 0.0053 0.0048 0.0042 0.0036 
Large Cap  0.0084 0.0073 0.0061 0.0158 0.0150 0.0141 
Mid Cap 0.0027 0.0023 0.0014 0.0057** 0.0049 0.0042 
Small Cap  0.0071 0.0061 0.0051 0.0121 0.0114 0.0106 
Micro Cap  0.0064** 0.0057** 0.0051** -0.0048* -0.0054* -0.0059* 
Construction 0.0047** 0.0039** 0.0031** 0.0021** 0.0014** 0.0008** 
Finance 0.0080** 0.0069** 0.0059** 0.0012** 0.0006** -0.0002* 
Manufacturing 0.0065** 0.0056** 0.0048** 0.0028** 0.0021** 0.0015** 
Retail Trade 0.0067** 0.0055 0.0042 0.0017 0.0008 0.0000 
Wholesale Trade 0.0018** 0.0079** 0.0094** 0.0065** 0.0062** 0.0058** 
Transportation  0.0057** 0.0048** 0.0038** 0.0048** 0.0041** 0.0033** 
Services 0.0042** 0.0035** 0.0028** 0.0011 0.0005 0.0000 
Spain 0.0064** 0.0054** 0.0044** 0.0035** 0.0028** 0.0021** 
Portugal 0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0042** 0.0001** -0.0004* -0.0010* 
Total 0.0059** 0.0052** 0.0044** 0.0025** 0.0018** 0.0012** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 14 – Moving Average (25,200,1) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 89.5% 89.5% 89.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 100.0% 96.6% 100.0% 100.0% 96.6% 96.6% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 93.5% 91.3% 91.3% 100.0% 93.5% 95.7% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 95.0% 97.5% 92.5% 92.5% 87.5% 87.5% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 100.0% 96.0% 96.0% 
Large Cap 87.5% 93.8% 100.0% 100.0% 93.8% 93.8% 
Mid Cap  95.1% 92.7% 95.1% 95.1% 92.7% 92.7% 
Small Cap 97.1% 97.1% 91.4% 100.0% 91.4% 94.3% 
Micro Cap 92.5% 91.4% 90.3% 98.9% 95.7% 95.7% 
Construction 94.7% 94.7% 89.5% 100.0% 94.7% 94.7% 
Finance 96.8% 93.5% 93.5% 100.0% 96.8% 100.0% 
Manufacturing 96.5% 94.7% 91.2% 98.2% 94.7% 93.0% 
Retail Trade 85.7% 85.7% 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 80.0% 
Transportation 89.7% 89.7% 96.6% 100.0% 93.1% 93.1% 
Services 89.2% 91.9% 91.9% 94.6% 91.9% 94.6% 
Spain 95.4% 93.8% 93.1% 97.7% 92.3% 93.1% 
Portugal 89.1% 90.9% 90.9% 100.0% 98.2% 98.2% 
Total 93.5% 93.0% 92.4% 98.4% 94.1% 94.6% 
Table 15 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,200,1). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0212** 0.0202** 0.0193** 0.0055** 0.0046** 0.0038** 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0096** 0.0084** 0.0073** 0.0050** 0.0040** 0.0031** 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0028** 0.0024** 0.0014** -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0019 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0033** 0.0021** 0.0010** 0.0002** -0.0007* -0.0016 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0017 0.0016 0.0007 -0.0001 
Large Cap  0.0087 0.0071 0.0055 0.0147 0.0134 0.0121 
Mid Cap 0.0068** 0.0062** 0.0050** 0.0088** 0.0078** 0.0069** 
Small Cap  0.0081 0.0068 0.0055 0.0119 0.0110 0.0100 
Micro Cap  0.0029** 0.0020** 0.0012** -0.0074* -0.0082* -0.0089* 
Construction 0.0029** 0.0017** 0.0005** 0.0005** -0.0004* -0.0014* 
Finance 0.0099** 0.0086** 0.0073** 0.0025** 0.0016** 0.0006** 
Manufacturing 0.0048** 0.0037** 0.0026** 0.0009** 0.0001 -0.0008 
Retail Trade 0.0159** 0.0144** 0.0129** 0.0118** 0.0107** 0.0095** 
Wholesale Trade 0.0073** 0.0133** 0.0146** 0.0119** 0.0113** 0.0107** 
Transportation  0.0038** 0.0025** 0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0003** -0.0008 
Services 0.0021** 0.0012** 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0012 
Spain 0.0073** 0.0061** 0.0048** 0.0047** 0.0037** 0.0028** 
Portugal 0.0004** 0.0001** -0.0006* -0.0052* -0.0059* -0.0066* 
Total 0.0052** 0.0043** 0.0032** 0.0017** 0.0009** 0.0000** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 16 – Moving Average (5,200,2) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 100.0% 100.0% 94.7% 89.5% 100.0% 89.5% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 96.6% 100.0% 93.1% 96.6% 96.6% 93.1% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 95.7% 95.7% 97.8% 97.8% 97.8% 95.7% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 90.0% 92.5% 92.5% 90.0% 90.0% 85.0% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 98.0% 94.0% 94.0% 96.0% 98.0% 98.0% 
Large Cap 93.8% 93.8% 93.8% 93.8% 100.0% 87.5% 
Mid Cap  95.1% 92.7% 95.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Small Cap 97.1% 97.1% 97.1% 100.0% 100.0% 94.3% 
Micro Cap 95.7% 96.8% 93.5% 89.2% 92.5% 90.3% 
Construction 94.7% 100.0% 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 89.5% 
Finance 100.0% 93.5% 96.8% 93.5% 100.0% 96.8% 
Manufacturing 96.5% 94.7% 93.0% 94.7% 93.0% 94.7% 
Retail Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 89.7% 93.1% 96.6% 93.1% 100.0% 86.2% 
Services 94.6% 97.3% 94.6% 91.9% 94.6% 91.9% 
Spain 94.6% 94.6% 93.1% 94.6% 95.4% 93.8% 
Portugal 98.2% 98.2% 98.2% 92.7% 98.2% 90.9% 
Total 95.7% 95.7% 94.6% 94.1% 96.2% 93.0% 
Table 17 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(5,200,2). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0171** 0.0156** 0.0141** -0.0075* -0.0087* -0.0100* 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0074** 0.0056** 0.0039** -0.0022* -0.0035* -0.0048* 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0011** 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0035** 0.0024** 0.0012** 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0100** 0.0085** 0.0070** 0.0038** 0.0027** 0.0016** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0067** 0.0053 0.0040 0.0087** 0.0077** 0.0067** 
Large Cap  -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0051 0.0042 0.0027 0.0011 
Mid Cap 0.0033 0.0024 0.0010 0.0072** 0.0059** 0.0047 
Small Cap  0.0070 0.0051 0.0032 0.0113 0.0099 0.0085 
Micro Cap  0.0103** 0.0090** 0.0078** -0.0022* -0.0032* -0.0041* 
Construction 0.0007** -0.0010* -0.0027* -0.0043 -0.0056 -0.0070 
Finance -0.0022* -0.0038* -0.0054* -0.0060* -0.0071 -0.0082 
Manufacturing 0.0081** 0.0065** 0.0050** 0.0038** 0.0027** 0.0015** 
Retail Trade 0.0239** 0.0220** 0.0201** 0.0218** 0.0202** 0.0187** 
Wholesale Trade 0.0091** 0.0147** 0.0156** 0.0102** 0.0094** 0.0086** 
Transportation  0.0068** 0.0050** 0.0031** 0.0027** 0.0013** -0.0001* 
Services 0.0138** 0.0126** 0.0115** 0.0086** 0.0078** 0.0069** 
Spain 0.0066** 0.0050** 0.0033** 0.0045** 0.0032** 0.0020** 
Portugal 0.0085** 0.0078** 0.0067** -0.0006* -0.0015* -0.0025* 
Total 0.0072** 0.0058** 0.0043** 0.0030** 0.0018** 0.0007** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 18 – Moving Average (25,50,2) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 94.7% 94.7% 100.0% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 93.1% 96.6% 96.6% 93.1% 100.0% 93.1% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 97.8% 100.0% 97.8% 97.8% 97.8% 97.8% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 97.5% 97.5% 97.5% 92.5% 97.5% 92.5% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 90.0% 100.0% 100.0% 96.0% 98.0% 94.0% 
Large Cap 100.0% 93.8% 81.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Mid Cap  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 97.6% 97.6% 97.6% 
Small Cap 88.6% 97.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Micro Cap 94.6% 100.0% 100.0% 91.4% 96.8% 91.4% 
Construction 100.0% 100.0% 94.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Finance 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 96.8% 93.5% 93.5% 
Manufacturing 96.5% 100.0% 100.0% 93.0% 100.0% 94.7% 
Retail Trade 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 86.2% 93.1% 93.1% 96.6% 93.1% 96.6% 
Services 97.3% 100.0% 100.0% 91.9% 100.0% 91.9% 
Spain 94.6% 99.2% 97.7% 94.6% 97.7% 93.8% 
Portugal 96.4% 98.2% 100.0% 96.4% 98.2% 98.2% 
Total 95.1% 98.9% 98.4% 95.1% 97.8% 95.1% 
Table 19 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,50,2). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0223** 0.0214** 0.0204** -0.0018* -0.0027* -0.0035* 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0095** 0.0084** 0.0072** 0.0022** 0.0013** 0.0004** 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0025 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0080** 0.0069** 0.0058** 0.0030** 0.0022** 0.0013** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0087** 0.0077** 0.0066** 0.0090** 0.0082** 0.0074** 
Large Cap  0.0128 0.0113 0.0098 0.0146 0.0134 0.0122 
Mid Cap 0.0108** 0.0103** 0.0091** 0.0095** 0.0085** 0.0076** 
Small Cap  0.0029 0.0014 0.0000 0.0093 0.0083 0.0072 
Micro Cap  0.0075** 0.0066** 0.0057** -0.0040* -0.0047* -0.0054* 
Construction 0.0075** 0.0063** 0.0052** 0.0052** 0.0043** 0.0034** 
Finance 0.0040** 0.0026** 0.0013** -0.0044* -0.0054* -0.0064* 
Manufacturing 0.0052** 0.0040** 0.0029** 0.0018** 0.0009** 0.0000 
Retail Trade 0.0197** 0.0182** 0.0168** 0.0153** 0.0142** 0.0131** 
Wholesale Trade 0.0103** 0.0162** 0.0174** 0.0100** 0.0094** 0.0088** 
Transportation  0.0087** 0.0073** 0.0060** 0.0037** 0.0027** 0.0017** 
Services 0.0121** 0.0112** 0.0104** 0.0067** 0.0061** 0.0055** 
Spain 0.0072** 0.0059** 0.0046** 0.0044** 0.0034** 0.0025** 
Portugal 0.0093** 0.0091** 0.0084** 0.0001** -0.0006* -0.0013* 
Total 0.0078** 0.0069** 0.0058** 0.0031** 0.0022** 0.0014** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 20 – Moving Average (25,100,2) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 94.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 100.0% 96.6% 96.6% 96.6% 96.6% 96.6% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 93.5% 95.7% 97.8% 97.8% 95.7% 97.8% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 90.0% 97.5% 95.0% 95.0% 97.5% 97.5% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 96.0% 94.0% 96.0% 92.0% 96.0% 96.0% 
Large Cap 87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Mid Cap  87.8% 90.2% 100.0% 92.7% 90.2% 97.6% 
Small Cap 97.1% 91.4% 88.6% 97.1% 100.0% 97.1% 
Micro Cap 97.8% 100.0% 97.8% 95.7% 97.8% 96.8% 
Construction 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 94.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Finance 87.1% 93.5% 93.5% 100.0% 93.5% 93.5% 
Manufacturing 96.5% 94.7% 98.2% 93.0% 94.7% 96.5% 
Retail Trade 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 96.6% 100.0% 93.1% 93.1% 96.6% 100.0% 
Services 97.3% 97.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 97.3% 
Spain 93.1% 95.4% 96.2% 96.2% 95.4% 96.2% 
Portugal 98.2% 98.2% 98.2% 94.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 94.6% 96.2% 96.8% 95.7% 96.8% 97.3% 
Table 21 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,100,2). 
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With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 0.0173** 0.0167** 0.0161* 0.0043** 0.0038** 0.0033** 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 0.0084** 0.0076** 0.0069** 0.0054** 0.0048** 0.0042** 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0017 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 0.0039** 0.0031** 0.0023** 0.0014** 0.0008** 0.0001** 
Beta [0;0.5[ 0.0077** 0.0069** 0.0061 0.0061 0.0054 0.0048 
Large Cap  0.0082 0.0072 0.0062 0.0170 0.0163 0.0155 
Mid Cap 0.0025 0.0022 0.0013 0.0071** 0.0064** 0.0057** 
Small Cap  0.0056 0.0047 0.0037 0.0115 0.0108 0.0101 
Micro Cap  0.0076** 0.0069** 0.0063** -0.0042* -0.0047* -0.0052* 
Construction 0.0044** 0.0036** 0.0028** 0.0025** 0.0019** 0.0012** 
Finance 0.0105** 0.0092** 0.0080** 0.0018** 0.0011** 0.0003** 
Manufacturing 0.0059** 0.0052** 0.0044** 0.0025** 0.0019** 0.0013** 
Retail Trade 0.0186** 0.0176** 0.0166** 0.0139** 0.0132** 0.0124** 
Wholesale Trade 0.0005** 0.0066** 0.0081** 0.0054** 0.0050** 0.0046** 
Transportation  0.0045** 0.0036** 0.0027** 0.0048** 0.0041** 0.0035** 
Services 0.0035** 0.0028** 0.0021** 0.0018** 0.0013** 0.0008 
Spain 0.0059** 0.0050** 0.0041** 0.0043** 0.0036** 0.0029** 
Portugal 0.0067** 0.0066** 0.0060** 0.0004** -0.0001* -0.0005* 
Total 0.0061** 0.0055** 0.0047 0.0031** 0.0025** 0.0019** 
* - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) but below 0. 
** - Beat its average B&H (against sector/country/size/beta) and above 0. 
Table 22 – Moving Average (25,200,2) Sharpe Ratio results. 
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 With Short Selling Without  Short Selling 
Transaction costs 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 0.30% 0.65% 1.00% 
Beta [1.1;2[ 100.0% 94.7% 89.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Beta [0.9;1.1[ 89.7% 93.1% 89.7% 96.6% 93.1% 96.6% 
Beta [0.7;0.9[ 84.8% 87.0% 93.5% 97.8% 93.5% 95.7% 
Beta [0.5;0.7[ 97.5% 92.5% 92.5% 90.0% 92.5% 92.5% 
Beta [0;0.5[ 90.0% 94.0% 92.0% 98.0% 98.0% 96.0% 
Large Cap 93.8% 100.0% 93.8% 93.8% 93.8% 100.0% 
Mid Cap  95.1% 92.7% 92.7% 97.6% 97.6% 97.6% 
Small Cap 82.9% 85.7% 91.4% 97.1% 100.0% 100.0% 
Micro Cap 92.5% 92.5% 91.4% 95.7% 92.5% 92.5% 
Construction 84.2% 89.5% 84.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Finance 96.8% 93.5% 90.3% 100.0% 100.0% 96.8% 
Manufacturing 93.0% 98.2% 94.7% 96.5% 94.7% 93.0% 
Retail Trade 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wholesale Trade 80.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transportation 89.7% 86.2% 89.7% 96.6% 96.6% 100.0% 
Services 89.2% 86.5% 91.9% 89.2% 86.5% 91.9% 
Spain 91.5% 93.1% 90.8% 94.6% 93.8% 93.8% 
Portugal 90.9% 89.1% 94.5% 100.0% 98.2% 100.0% 
Total 91.4% 91.9% 91.9% 96.2% 95.1% 95.7% 
Table 23 – Percentage of p-values lower than 0.05, for MA(25,200,2). 
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As we look through the results they still suggest a better performance of Moving 
averages combinations over higher betas, as well as smaller Capitalization firms, 
following the results from Shynkevich, 2012. When we consider bootstrap p-values of 
these indicators, we again observe that most of the profits are statistically significant, 
with a p-value below 0.05. 
As for the sector bias we have to be careful when analysing, as the sample is not big 
enough to reach a strong conclusion. For example, there are only five companies in the 
Wholesale Trade, which justifies the drop of 20 p.p. on the bootstrapping analysis of the 
MA(25,200,0). However results suggest that across these technical trading rules 
profitability is constantly achieved in Retail and Wholesale companies, differing from 
Fernandes (2015). 
The geography results suggest a better performance in Spain over Portugal, however 
this can be explained by the large number of small capitalization companies existing in 
these countries. 
5. Conclusion 
The main research questions to be answered by this dissertation are: (1) “Are the 
Portuguese and Spanish stock markets efficient”; (2) “Are the profits from these 
technical trading rules the same for every type of trader?;” and (3) “Are these profits are 
predominant in any type of stock?”. 
In order to support an solution to this doubtfulness, we tested different types of simple 
technical trading rules: Filter Rules, Relative Strength Indicator, Bollinger Bands and 
Moving averages. We tested the Iberian Markets, a total of 185 stocks, over a 6 year 
time frame. We also considered different transaction costs as well as short selling 
abilities, giving us a total of 39,960 tested strategies. 
First we tested the profitability of Filter Rules and Relative Strength Indicator, which 
showed us that these strategies were unable to beat the buy-and-hold, even if it was 
negative during this period. 
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Secondly, we tested the Bollinger Bands. The profitability (Sharpe Ratio) showed us 
that this indicator was better performed with higher inputs, also they are statistically 
significant. Results suggested a higher performance of this indicator in higher betas and 
smaller capitalization stocks. 
Thirdly, we tested 27 variations of Moving Averages. The Sharpe Ratios of these 
strategies showed us mixed results depending on its inputs. The most well-known 
combinations from Brock et. al. (1992) did not beat the buy-and-hold, suggesting self-
correcting markets. Regarding the combination that beat the buy-and-hold in all types of 
market condition, they have higher performance in higher betas and low capitalization 
stocks, same as Bollinger Bands, suggesting the effect of stock type on its profitability. 
Both of Moving Averages and Bollinger Bands results suggest higher performance in 
stocks of Retail and Wholesale companies stocks, contradicting the results of Fernandes 
(2015). Regarding the geography, the results are better in Spain. 
To answer the first question: results suggest mixed feelings regarding the market 
efficiency, as there are some strategies which outperform buy-and-hold and we could 
not predict which strategies would be the ones which perform better.  
Regarding the second question, results show us that transaction costs and short selling 
constrains have a huge impact over its profitability, making institutional investors prone 
to have more profitability. 
However, we should always present these results with some caution, as there are some 
limitations derived from our methodology. For instance, in our sample we only take into 
account stocks that remain “alive” at the end of this period, which can induct a 
“survivorship bias” to our results. Another issue is the small size sample, as there are 
sectors with a small number of stocks, which can impact the results on its statistically 
significance. We propose further research with more stocks and other methodologies in 
order to overcome these limitations and/or to explain these profits. 
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 Appendix 
Appendix 1 - Portuguese and Spanish stocks 
1NKEMIA UICT GROUP CIPAN LIMITED DATA 
AB-BIOTICS CLINICA BAVIERA 
ABENGOA CODERE SA 
ABERTIS INFRAESTRUCTURAS COFINA 
ACCIONA COMMCENTER 
ACERINOX 'R' COMPTA 
ACS ACTIV.CONSTR.Y SERV. CONDURIL ENGENHARIA LIMITED DATA 
ADOLFO DOMINGUEZ CONST Y AUXILIAR DE FERR 
ADVEO GROUP INTERNACIONA COPAM LIMITED DATA 
ALMIRALL CORP EMPRESARIAL 
ALTIA CONSULTORES CORPORACION FINCA.ALBA 
ALTRI SGPS CORTICEIRA AMORIM 
AMADEUS IT HOLDING DEOLEO 
AMPER DISTRIBUIDORA INTNAC.DE ALIMENTACION 
ATRESMEDIA CORP DOGI INTL.FABRICS 
AZKOYEN DURO FELGUERA 
BANCO BPI DWS INVERVULCANO 
BANCO COMR.PORTUGUES 'R' EBIOSS ENERGY AD 
BANCO DE SABADELL EBRO FOODS 
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL EDP ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL 
BANCO SANTANDER EDP RENOVAVEIS 
BANIF EDREAMS ODIGEO 
BANKIA ELECNOR 
BANKINTER 'R' ENAGAS 
BARON DE LEY ENCE ENERGIA Y CELULOSA 
BBV.ARGENTARIA ENDESA 
BIONATURIS DER ENTRE CUA SOCIMI 
BIOSEARCH ERCROS 
BODEGAS RIOJANAS ESTORIL SOL 'B' 
BOLSAS Y MERCADOS ESPANOLES EUROESPES 
CAIXABANK EURONA WIRELESS TELECOM 
CAJA DE AHORROS DEL MEDITERRANEO F RAMADA INVESTIMENTOS 
CARBURES EUROPE FAES FARMA 
CATENON SA FERROVIAL 
CCT CORREIOS DE PORTUGAL FERSA ENERGIAS RNVBL. 
CEMENTOS PORT.VALDERR. FLUIDRA 
 CIA.VINICOLA DEL NORTE DE ESPANA FOMENTO CONSTR.Y CNTR. 
CIE AUTOMOTIVE FUNESPANA 
CIMENTOS DE PORTL.SGPS FUTEBOL CLUBE DO PORTO 
GALP ENERGIA SGPS MONTEPIO 
GAMESA CORPN.TEGC. MOTA ENGIL SGPS 
GAS NATURAL SDG NATRA 
GENERAL ALQUILER DE MAQUINARIA NEURON BIO 
GI.GLB.INTEL.TECHS.SGPS NEXPONOR SICAFI REIT 
GPO.EMPRESARIAL SAN JOSE NH HOTEL GR 
GRIFOLS ORD CL A NICOLAS CORREA 
GRINO ECOLOGIC NMAS1 DINAMIA 
GRUPO CATALANA OCCIDENTE NOS SGPS 
GRUPO EZENTIS NOVABASE 
HISPANIA ACT INM OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN 
IBERDROLA OREY ANTUNES 
IBERPAPEL GESTION PAPELES Y CARTONES DE EUROPA 
IBERSOL - SGPS PHARMA MAR 
IMAGINARIUM PHAROL SGPS 
IMMOBL.CON.GRAO-PARA PORTUCEL EMPRESA 
IMPRESA SGPS PRIM 
INAPA PROGADO LIMITED DATA 
INDITEX PROMORENT SOCIMI 
INDRA SISTEMAS PROMOTORA DE INFIC. 'A' (GRUPO PRISA) 
INMOBILIARIA COLONIAL PROSEGUR CIA.SECURIDAD 
INMOBILIARIA DEL SUR LIMITED DATA QUABIT INMOBILIARIA 
INTEL.SENSING ANYWHERE REALIA BUSINESS 
INYPSA INFORMES Y PROYECTOS RED ELECTRICA CORPN. 
JERONIMO MARTINS REDITUS 
LABORATORIO REIG JOFRE REN 
LAR ESPANA RLST.SOCIMI RENTA 4 SERV.DE INVN. 
LBOS.FARMACEUTICOS ROVI RENTA CORPN.REAL ESTATE 
LIBERBANK REPSOL YPF 
LINGOTES ESPECIALES SACYR 
LISGRAFICA SAG GEST 
LITHO FORMAS PORTUGUESA LTD DATA SANTANDER CARTERA MOBILIARIA 
LUZ SAUDE SDC INVESTIMENTOS 
MAPFRE SECUOYA GPO.DE COMCIOS. 
MARCH GESTION CARTERA BELLVER SEDA BARCELONA 'B' 
MARTIFER SEMAPA 
MEDCOMTECH SA SOCIETY AGUAS DA CURIA LIMITED DATA 
MEDIA CAPITAL SOLARIA ENERGIA Y MEDIO AMBIENTE 
MEDIASET ESPANA COMUNICACION SONAE CAPITAL 
 MELIA HOTELS INTL. SONAE COM LIMITED DATA 
MIQUEL Y COSTAS SONAE INDUSTRIA SGPS 
MONTEBALITO SONAE SGPS 
SONAGI LIMITED DATA TUBACEX 
SOTOGRANDE TUBOS REUNIDOS 
SPORT LISBOA E BENFICA FUTEBOL URBAS GUADAHERMOSA 
SPORTING CLUBE DE BRAGA VAA VISTA ALEGRE ATLANTI 
SPORTING LIMITED DATA VIDRALA 
SUMOL COMPAL VISCOFAN 
TECNICAS REUNIDAS VOCENTO 
TECNOCOM TC.Y ENERGIA VOUSSE CORP 
TEIXEIRA DUARTE WORLD WIDE WEB IBERCOM 
TELEFONICA ZARDOYA OTIS 
TESTA INMUEBLES EN RENTA SOCIMI ZINKIA ENTERTAINMENT 
TOYOTA CAETANO 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Excluded Companies 
BANCA CIVICA  METROVACESA  
BANCO ESPANOL DE CREDITO  NEGOCIO & ESTILO DE VIDA  
BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO  NPG TECHNOLOGY  
BBVA SOLIDEZ BP XVI  PESCANOVA  
BODACLICK  CEPSA  
BRISA-AUTSDS.DE PORTUGAL  REYAL URBIS  
CAMPOFRIO FOOD GROUP  SERVICE POINT SOLUTIONS  
FERGO AISA  SFO. GLB. PROCESSOR  
GRUPO NOSTRUM RNL SA   SNIACE  
GRUPO TAVEX   TEIXEIRA DUARTE  
IBERDROLA RENOVABLES  VERTICE TRSTA.GRADOS  
JAZZTEL  VUELING AIRLINES  
LETS GOWEX  
 
 
